

Problems in the Social  
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Study of Cities

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## Problems in the Social Sciences: Prolegomena to a Study of Cities

IT SEEMS, WHEN HUMANKIND EMERGES INTO HISTORY, IT IS already a city-dwelling species. To be sure, at the dawn of history most men *didn't* live in cities; most were either part of some nomadic group, or living in simple villages. And of these people, very little evidence remains. What *does* remain does not constitute *historical* evidence but rather is archaeological evidence. That is to say, while various sorts of artifacts are to be found of non-urban people, and this *does* constitute a species of "hard data," such data give no insight into the complex of judgments made by these people of their own experience of their world. Neither does it show how other peoples, encountering the first group, judged or were judged by the pre-historic community. Of such primitive, pre-historic peoples, it does not seem correct to say we understand them in any real way. All that exists is at best conjecture, however brilliant.<sup>1</sup>

But of people living in cities a wholly other situation obtains, in many cases.<sup>2</sup> Even where the city itself has disappeared, records of its existence and even of its character survive in the archives of its contemporary civilizations. In some cases the archaeological "hard data" for such cities include the contents of that civilization's equivalent of libraries. Such collections of written works, insofar as they go beyond

mere records of commercial transactions<sup>3</sup> and include literature and governmental records (which are, seemingly of necessity, always highly *interpretive* of situations, as well as descriptive), present a people in their own light, and thus express a humanity absent from other, *merely* archaeological accounts.

It is an as-yet-to-be-interpreted datum that emergence into *historical* development is something *attached*, as it were, to the emergence of cities. At this point, I note simply that the kinds of things properly called "historical evidence" are associated with cities. When—much later, presumably—un-citified nomads adopt some of the specifically "historical" modes of preserving their culture, it is with techniques learned from contact with city cultures.<sup>4</sup> And even so, the attempts of these nomads are unsystematic; the "storage facilities" for archival material and the like which cities afford are lacking for the nomad.

Another line of thought—related to the first—ties in here: It seems reasonable that it is only of cultures which have transmitted their own judgments of the world, their own history, to their descendents and successors, that we may predicate "civilization." The term itself is suggestive: To be civilized is to be, in the first instance, *civil*, to have the character of citizen. And to be a citizen is to be the citizen of some city or other exactly similar body-politic. It is this being-political aspect of human being which produces the durable character of human life which is essential to what we denominate "civilization." But it is puzzling: Why do citizens systematize their judgments into what we call "history?" Why do they make a special virtue of a *regular manner* of transmitting those judgments? What are the linkages between dwelling in cities (as opposed to more rudimentary social enclaves), a special concern for history, and being civilized?

Common sense offers proximate answers to these questions. A body-politic, as political, needs some mechanism whereby the acts of some citizens may be readily assessed by the rest of the body of citizenry, a body which is in all probability large, and in all probability *dynamic* in several senses. A more or less objective record of the common tradition—that which is called "history," of course—fills that need in a way which a simpler oral record will not. First, it is more readily shared with less chance of variation. Second, it is more stable within any given time-frame—over a period of generations, perhaps.

These demands are not, seemingly, operative in the relatively less complex world of the peasant village or nomadic tribe. Such a social enclave is small enough to be served by one or a few old "rememberers of the past;" the exigencies of the group's corporate life do not demand a long recollection in most areas (i.e., of events not likely to repeat themselves on an annual basis). Thus it would seem that not only is there a *coincidence* between being historical and being-city dwellers, but a veritable *correlation* based on needs not operative in sub-civic enclaves.

The provocative character of this discovery continues: Much of what is referred to when one thinks of the essence of Man is caught up in what history is understood to be.<sup>6</sup> For if history is a complex of judgments (which is suggested in the etymology of "history"), and Man is defined from one perspective as "*logon echon*," which means to possess the conceptualized result of judgment, among other things, then it is as historicizing being, in part, that *this* being or group of beings accedes to "humanity." Then, living in cities, which seems the precondition of the full emergence of this judgmental character which is of the essence of humanity, is a requirement of Man's nature and its fulfillment, as Aristotle noted so long ago.<sup>7</sup>

It is not my purpose to deny to non-citydwellers of the species the character of humanity altogether; it is stipulated these people do indeed make judgments and collect them in a species of history. Presumably human beings have always done so. But it seems that such non-citydwellers do not have so thoroughgoing an historical complex (nor do they require it) nor is it so *durable* as that of citydwellers (who knows anything of the *Hyksos* except what those utterly urbane ancients, the Egyptians, tell us?). It is simply that the *telos* of rationality, the most characteristic aspect of human being, is fulfilled only in the context of the city.

## I

So, to put it in the strongest form possible, to be concerned with human being is to have a necessary concern with cities. Coming to this conclusion, the complex of puzzles with which one is confronted waxes terrifically. Certainly the most basic of these is how cities came to be (as was suggested above) and what they are, anyway. This question

has been pervasive from classical antiquity forward, in the Western tradition; it is a burning issue for Weber, as it was for Aristotle. In fact, given the vast corpus of literature on cities, which is regularly expanding, it may be a *more* vital question today than it was in times past when cities were a more obvious center of human existence. One lengthy compendium suggests:

It is becoming *increasingly more difficult* to talk and write about 'the city.' Max Weber and Louis Wirth could catalogue the city's qualities as opposed to rurality and describe the people and life to be found there. But in the latter half of the twentieth century it is nearly impossible to analyze the city as place; the indeterminacy of this urban area befuddles all careful qualification and quantification, of its form, style, and inhabitants.<sup>8</sup> (emphasis added)

This remark comes from the introduction to a two-volume study of "megalopolis." There is a sense of the editor's frustration evident in these lines; the usual social-scientific tools are inadequate to their task, finally. Previous social-scientific inquiries could be satisfied with mere description of the difference between the city and the country, and clearly this was never sufficient. Such a description could only produce a picture of the specifically *urban* component of cities—the "material" appearance of that complex which is a city—without revealing the strictly *civic* core which founds that appearance. However, the author of the above-cited remark does not supplant the admittedly limited approach he describes with something more adequate. The tools he favors in the social-scientific description of the city are mere variants on the descriptive methods (however he may change his terms, now calling them quantification and qualification) which were used in perhaps less recondite manner by his predecessors. If his task seems more difficult, then it may be that it is not due to the excessive fluidity of the topic, but to some originary inadequacy of the tools of social-scientific inquiry itself to the project at hand.

That this may be so, that the assumptions and methods of the investigation brought to bear upon the question of how it stands with cities

and how it came to be *just so*, might very well be inadequate, has certainly occurred to other investigators. Scott Greer, for example, boldly states the problem:

With respect to the metropolis, then, we may ask: What kind of metaphors dominate our intellectual discourse? What images stand for the totality and are, for practical purposes, 'theories of the city?'<sup>9</sup>

In putting the problem of the very origin of cities (for to ask how we approach the city in thought is to ask of its historical, factual, *interpretational* origin), Greer clearly indicates the need to penetrate the common, uncritical assumptions which operate in the usual social-scientific investigations into cities. This is a dual criticism, of method and of result.

Subsidiary issues attach themselves to this general criticism: From a number of perspectives, it is obvious that the city "embodies the real nature of human nature [*sic*]," that it "is an expression of mankind in general and specifically of the social relations generated by territory."<sup>10</sup> But this observation (with which I agree, as should be obvious from the opening of this chapter) does not allow the author to conclude as he does: "The city is not an artifact or a residual arrangement."<sup>11</sup> It would be, surely, not inconsistent for the city to be very much an artificial product of human ingenuity, and still be entirely natural. As such, the city would simply be an expression of mankind's *natural* propensity for making things; the city would still be more than the outcome of human territorial propinquity. Here the real issue is to what extent the city is *simply* an artifact, and not also the creator of human being as civilized. This question may admit of no resolution, but the study of the interplay of forces such a study brings to the surface should prove productive in illustrating the city as an entity.

There is surely no lack of opinion about cities and their essence. It may be that there are too many opinions, each set forth in different contexts, many for purposes other than the explication of the city itself.<sup>12</sup> The matter is made more complex by the realization that the non-Western world cannot be ignored any longer. On the one hand, the non-Western world has many city-based cultures which are as old (in

some spots perhaps more enduring, if not actually older) than those of the West. In the second place, many non-Western areas are now developing new city-based societies, either for the first time or after such a long period of non-urban culture that what is created has no possible connection with the city-based culture of the remote past.<sup>13</sup> A number of new perspectives enter the lists.

At the same time as a vast number of opinions have been developing, it is interesting that the special place of the city in Western civilization<sup>14</sup> has been increasingly eroded in modernity. Historically this erosion seems linked to the emergence of the modern state, so that from the time of Machiavelli the attributes of the relatively independent cities of the Middle Ages rapidly came to be associated with the larger, nominally national entities. By the middle of the 17th century, it was possible for Hobbes to apply the word for city as a body of citizens (as opposed to the term for the physical place of the city) to the new kind of state.<sup>15</sup>

With this erosion, it has been necessary to formulate new ways of addressing urban problems. Rather than the city being largely independent—equally the case in classical antiquity and the Middle Ages<sup>16</sup>—it is now merely an administrative unit to be rationalized into a larger system of similar units. In some cases, the city is identified both conceptually and geographically with the next larger unit in the hierarchy; San Francisco offers an example of this. On the other hand, the city of Los Angeles is not entirely identical with the county of Los Angeles; dozens of small enclaves within the county and administratively distinct from the city of Los Angeles have been incorporated over the years. This poses an administrative problem since such enclaves, nominally cities, are unable to provide basic civic services but must rely on the county for them. This sort of situation provokes public administration experts to adumbrate criteria, based on public-services considerations, for the definition of a city.<sup>17</sup> But such criteria are always merely *urban* criteria.

Finally, of course, there is the simple *territorial expansion* of urbanity. In the past, cities have been well-defined spatially and conceptually. Spatially, the *urbs* was limited by sacred walls; conceptually, the *civitas* was defined by the criteria of citizenship.<sup>18</sup> Each of these limiting factors has simply disappeared, with the redefinition of the city as a merely local administrative unit. On the one hand, urban space has

been extended by higher-echelon legislative fiat, in response to the pressure of local civic groups and politicians gauging possibilities of future growth.<sup>19</sup> On the other hand, the *actual* criteria for the exercise of "citizen's rights" and prerogatives in the city has nothing to do with identification with the city, or even residence in it. For example, the executive committee of a corporation based in Chicago or Ivrea (*vis-a-vis* cities, of course, *national* location is no measure of foreignness) can directly influence the acts of New York's or London's administration. In fact, it appears to some thinkers that *city* problems have disappeared, *propter se*.<sup>20</sup> In the place of cities, there now emerges the "urban area," or the "metropolitan area," or simply the "megapolis." It has certain local administrations whose independence of action is necessarily circumscribed by the existence of higher-echelon administrative exigencies. Its economic activity is unified to a greater or lesser extent by the modern transport facilities typically associated with a developed urban area.<sup>21</sup>

There is, then, in the context of the very first questions of cities, *viz.*, the question of their origin and being, a complex of difficulties affecting progress toward a solution. This complex may be summarized as two-fold: First there is the "loss" of a clear sense of what a city is, evidenced in the plethora of opinions on the subject and the disappearance of the city in the larger political entity. Second, there is the explicitly or implicitly admitted inadequacy of social-scientific methodology to provide a description of cities, an inadequacy deriving, apparently, from a less-than-adequate preliminary conceptualization of the city.<sup>22</sup>

The confusion is only exacerbated by the place of the city in traditional political thinking. This thinking is a significant part of the traditional self-knowledge of the species. It is of importance in all cultural enclaves, and has remarkable similarity across cultural lines, as well as important divergences.<sup>23</sup> Especially in Western political thought, the city has been the archetypical political body, as was noted above.

But political thought has built within it a trap. Hannah Arendt, summarizing the development of political thought in history, describes that trap in this way:

Our tradition of political thought began when Plato discovered that it is somehow inherent in the philosophical

experience to turn away from the common world of human affairs; it ended when nothing was left of this experience but the opposition of thinking and acting, which, depriving thought of reality and action of sense, makes both meaningless.<sup>24</sup>

The nature of current political thinking is clear; to think of the character of politics is to step back from the actually political. This is certainly the case, in the context of modern Western political thinking.<sup>25</sup> The very image of the political inquirer, whether as sociologist or political scientist, is that of "value-free" observation by a neutral observer. This image has its roots in the development of the philosophical perspective at the foundation of Western European culture in the 8th century B.C., and was mightily potentiated with the beginning of "modernity" in the 17th century.<sup>26</sup> With the development of this "modern" philosophical reflection, whether of the nominally "empirical" sort or of the nominally "rational" sort, as Arendt correctly notes, *thought* of the political is no longer productive of action, nor does action-like behavior result from it, except at the distance the neutral observer preserves. I.e., a "neutral observer" may manipulate experimentally the "observed," but will not act in the context of observation as "one of the observed."

If the city is in its most basic character a political entity and collection of political entities of some sort, and the actual connection of thinking and acting, which is the very essence of politics, is obscured, then surely, political entities—actors and places of action—must be obscured as well.

This obscurity, to which Arendt points, is shown in the sort of discourse that comes to be substituted for genuinely political discourse—and the results of which we have seen already in the remarks of social scientists. E.g., statistical "uniformities," in Max Weber's telling expression, come to be "regarded as manifestations of the understandable subjective meaning of a course of social action."<sup>27</sup> The "formulations of a rational course of subjectively understandable action," which have in the past been understood as the very heart of the political, and the very root of the "civcity" of cities,<sup>28</sup> are now meaningful only when they allow of reduction to this special sort of empirical generalization.<sup>29</sup> Weber is *correct* in his interpretation of this demand for understanding

of the political entity through strictly empirical generalization as an attempt to develop an understanding of the "subjective meaning-complex of action" which is readily transmuted, in the same way the data and facts (which are data transmogrified through interpretation) of the natural sciences are made explainable, through an often uncritical use of "cause-effect" explanatory devices.<sup>30</sup>

The assumption of a rather Cartesian notion of causality and temporality, a making of efficient causality the only knowable causality,<sup>31</sup> is inconsistent with the experience of the political as largely *spontaneous*, as spontaneous event provoking equally spontaneous response, as amenable to the judgments of taste and significance, and as eminently *fluid*. To the extent that cities are at once the spontaneous event arising from such a political experience, and the locus in which such politics continues to occur, it becomes perfectly clear why modern social science and the peculiar brand of "politics" arising within its *milieux* have found the questions of the origin and being of the city so puzzling. In fact, attempts to address such puzzles would transgress the limits of what such a science might properly investigate.

In brief then, modern social science enshrines the end of modern philosophy, the dichotomy between thought and action which Hannah Arendt describes so precisely. Doing so, it cannot address a question about the result of action, nor of the locus of action, both of which, it shall be seen below, <sup>32</sup> are part of the *very essence of the city*.

This being the case, it is equally impossible for social science, and any disciplined activity founded methodologically (or otherwise) on the social sciences, to address the very real parallel question to that of the origin and being of the city-as-it-is, the question of the city-as-it-should-be—the question of city planning.

## II

The failure of cities is an intellectual one. It is brought about by the failure of intellectuals to generate a viable concept of the modern city and a modern region. Attempts are made to deflect attention from this bald

fact by laying the blame on politics, on the lack of money on any cause but the root one. Of course, all these things play their role in the total process, but until there is generated a vivid and impelling concept of what we are fundamentally driving at, the other factors cannot play their role in the total process.<sup>33</sup>

In so few words, Edmund Bacon succinctly grasps the problem with all modern discussions of cities. Without some concept of what may be called, for lack of a more apt expression, "civicity," the actuality of the city seems doomed to remain obscure, and all attempts to resolve the manifold human problems arising in the urban context will prove stillborn. If such is absent, then that is a failure in the domain of theory.

Bacon is also correct in his assertion of the attempt to deflect attention from this deficiency by shifting focus to what are really post-conceptual issues.<sup>34</sup> He is not alone in noting this deflection; what he alleges of the discussion of cities is only part of a larger problem running throughout the application of social science to practical difficulties.<sup>35</sup>

To some extent, this dual failure is the outcome of that movement in social thought culminating in 19th century liberalism, surviving, but failing to aptly address problems of the human, political domain apparent in the 20th century. Leo Strauss characterized this failure of liberalism:

Liberalism negated the political; by doing so, liberalism did not banish the political from the world but only concealed it. Liberalism brought about that politics is carried on by means of antipolitical speech. Liberalism has not killed the political, but merely killed understanding of the political and sincerity regarding the political. To clear the obfuscation of reality which liberalism has caused, the political must be brought out and shown to be completely undeniable.<sup>36</sup>

Modern social science, in turn, is the creature of the old liberalism. It is, in a very real sense, the inquiry demanded by the "operators" of the reforming Western European states, as to the feasibility of

change, just as the modern physical sciences are the vehicles of modern technological advance. But in its obscuring of the political, or perhaps, its acceptance of the claim of the hiddenness of the political in other, more *certain* data, by the burgeoning social sciences, liberalism was committed to the interpretation of human affairs in a manner an earlier age would have deemed foreign to their nature. The subsequent adoption of a nominally mechanistic, naturalistic mode of explanation in the areas of social concern, and most especially for this inquiry, of the manner of civic and urban operation, obscured in a fatal way the city as the symbol of human political existence.<sup>37</sup> Again, this is not new. After all, in the political writings of Plato and Aristotle, the material basis of society, the obvious and easily described component of social development is discussed at some length. Aristotle is quick to claim that political society's existence is durable by virtue of its conducting to living well. A significant part of his discussion of the state is of the mechanism whereby life itself, in the most materialist terms, is possible.<sup>38</sup> Such aspects of the *polis*, it may be assumed, were of concern to each of the elements of Aristotle's audience—would-be philosophers, scions of prominent families intending a political career, and those simply seeking to be good citizens. This materialistic aspect of human society remains significant, though to a varying degree, in later accounts. The problem is always the practical one, how is life itself possible, and the answer to this is "economic." But it appears correct to say that both for classical antiquity and late antiquity, and for the Middle Ages, the materialistic account of human society, or an account merely of the most productive of "political" manipulations, is by itself insufficient. Understanding of human society needed something more.

Notions of individual interest, developing greater influence at the beginning of the modern period,<sup>39</sup> can be seen as a means of *focussing* upon the readily identified and quantitatively treated, occasionally to exclusion of something less readily defined. Finally, in the latter half of the 19th century, two major thinkers, Mill and Marx (or at least, Marxists), develop mechanistic, materialistic modes of explanation of social affairs which deliberately seek to eliminate seeming excesses of *merely* political accounts. Mill simply separated the laws of production in the political-economic sphere, laws which could be dealt with quantitatively, as he believed, from the qualitative opinions governing distri-

bution.<sup>40</sup> Marx, in turn, made labor, a "material human activity," the observable basis of a material account of society in which politics disappeared.<sup>41</sup>

However, this shift in emphasis from consideration of the variable, seemingly spontaneous events in society and the relations of its members to a demand for the seemingly invariable, which has continued to render the intellectual establishment largely unable to address questions of the human political domain of which the city is the symbol (in several senses), has always been the object of criticism from within that establishment. Hannah Arendt, surely one of the standard bearers of this critical element, summed up that criticism in the following terms, that "the conditions of human existence—life itself, natality, and mortality, worldliness, plurality and the earth [factors measurable directly or in ratios]—can never 'explain' what we are or answer the question of who we are for the simple reason that they never condition us absolutely."<sup>42</sup> Surely, if these material conditions of human existence itself are not adequate to the explanation of who we are, or by extension, what we do, the somewhat more remote material structures of the social environment—partly artifact, yet *mutatis mutandis* still a natural by-product of human action—will be, however illustrative, equally inadequate in the final analysis.

It appears, then, if the city is archetypal human environment and, simultaneously, human creation, and it is, moreover, the symbol of that uniquely human sort of activity which is called politics, it will be necessary to inquire after that which is hidden in the standard social scientific accounts of cities (and at the same time pointed to by these accounts, by making the observer sensitive to what is lacking or hidden by them)—descriptions of the matter from which they are constructed, and of the mechanistic agencies of change within them—if the objective of a definitive theory of the city is to be fulfilled.

### III

If it is true that materialism has been a seductive point of view for the inquiry into the social and political dimension of human existence from the beginning of Western thought,<sup>43</sup> it is equally true that the modern version of that materialism, and the liberalism to which it gives

rise—and reciprocally, by which it is furthered—is a distinctively modern, post-16th century phenomenon. Though the currents, trends and ideas which produced this uniquely modern way of thinking had been developing from the end of the 14th century, it is conventional to regard the proposal of his method by Descartes and the subsequent developments of the point of view that method enshrined as the moment in which modernity is born. If the notion of the political and political community is hidden by the social-scientific perspective built upon the modern, post-Cartesian point of view, what is it in the Cartesian systems which allows for the disappearance of something so essentially human?

It is not so much the formulation of new philosophical propositions which Descartes claims as his contribution;<sup>44</sup> rather it is the method he advances as a surety for such propositions as he accepts that secured Descartes' place. This method represented, on the one hand, the culmination of late Scholastic experience (in which Descartes was steeped), and on the other the essence of the experience of Descartes' own generation. This absolute heart of the new philosophy starts and ever returns to scepticism, or at least a thoroughgoing doubt, of any proposition which is not completely clear and evident. That which is most suspicious—if not for Descartes, then at least for the Cartesians—is the sensory datum.<sup>45</sup> Regardless of its rectitude, the received opinion developing from Descartes' insight is that one's own ideas are relatively clear, and can be carefully distinguished. One's sensory impressions, however, are frequently unclear, and more frequently still, indistinct. Hasty judgments from such data are the preeminent form of error.<sup>46</sup>

A concomitant of this opinion is the devaluation of what is expounded by others, or conveyed to one as the position of another person. Communication of such opinions is in the first instance through the outer senses, through hearing and, to a lesser extent, seeing the other expound his views. If the communication of the senses is suspect, then understanding of what the other has to say is also suspect ("Have I heard correctly?"). This suspicion is only partly relieved in the event I can verify from my own inner experience that which I understand the other to be claiming as valid and true. There remains the question, of course, that what is verified in this inner experience is indeed the same as what was meant by the other.

This suspicion of the sensory datum, and thus of the opinions of

others, is also a suspicion of the independent reality of the "outer" world. It is my inner sensations, and more especially, reflection upon it, and understanding arising from it, which is ultimately "real," under the implications of Cartesian philosophy.<sup>47</sup>

The turn-within is not without precedent in the development of thinking. In the West, it has been a powerful element in Christian thought nominally originating with Augustine of Hippo, but having roots in the late Stoa, and a species of fruition in the neo-Platonism of Plotinus, with its new understanding of the *ego*. Similar idealisms develop in other cultures; there is some reason to believe that 16th and 17th century reports of neo-Confucian idealism were influential in early modern development of that line in the West.<sup>48</sup> Such a turn within changes the way in which history is understood in a decisive way. The observing person, contemplating the actions of others, and the possibility of both reaction and original action of his own, is set off from the meaning of the complex of social activity which, ordered and explained temporally, constitutes both the history of the society and the history (or perhaps better, the historical context) of the individual. The historical context, under this mutation, is no longer obvious, requiring a merely chronological exposition. It is now obscure, requiring painstaking interpretation. As Gadamer has suggested,<sup>49</sup> something now is deemed meaningful precisely because its meaning is not clear.

With this coming-to-be-obscure of the historical life of a society, politics is rendered, not so much obsolete as confusing. The citizen, as a member of a body-politic, or a political actor, requires a clear understanding of the society in which he lives, an understanding that is in the first instance historical. This understanding must be clear and present to him at all times when he is called to function in the civic domain. But the history is not present to him except as something obscure, i.e., in a fashion which does not serve his immediate need to act decisively. All the citizen has is a suspect impression which may be a lie, derived from sensory observation, or reported by another, and in fact, his reason may not be sufficient to discern the fallacious character of the impression which he has.<sup>50</sup>

Briefly, the problem stacks up like this: Scepticism as to the reliability of the senses leads to doubt about the natural world about one, but also about the discourse one has with others about the human social

domain in which one lives. Concomitant with this is the doubt of the tradition which one inherits in the history of that social domain, which is also subject to transmission in various ways from "outside." The modern social-scientific establishment embodies this dilemma; its inability to adumbrate a concept of the modern city may be baldly put as the inability of the social scientist to distinguish the "true" from the "false" in the domain of human action proper (such a distinction not being at all quantifiable either directly or as a ratio). In fact, it is not too much to say that the social scientist is not necessarily aware that there is a real distinction to be made; in this he is simply standing at the end of the end of the modern age. For the perception of qualities which are, though qualitative, objectively (or at least, intersubjectively) true, there is substituted the subjectively valued, which may be ranked.<sup>51</sup> As subjective, the normative utility of such valuation is properly deemed dubious. Thus the social scientist and the political operator he serves are compelled to adopt a new definition of politics.

This observation, admittedly put in a somewhat polemical form, is neither new nor controversial. On the contrary, this redefinition of politics is the heart of the problem addressed by Hannah Arendt in *Crises of the Republic*. A major theme running through this volume of essays is the need to find "*a priori*" justifications for the predetermined solutions of nominally political problems. In "Lying in Politics," she offers a compelling image of the activity of the new political operator in the context of the Viet Nam conflict:

They [political public-relations experts] were obviously different from the ordinary image-makers. Their distinction lies in that they were problem-solvers as well. Hence they were not just intelligent, but prided themselves on being 'rational,' and they were to a rather frightening degree above 'sentimentality' and in love with 'theory,' the world of sheer mental effort. They were eager to find formulas, preferably expressed in pseudo-mathematical language, that would unify the most disparate phenomena with which reality presented them; that is, they were eager to discover *laws* by which to explain and

predict political and historical facts as though they were as necessary and thus as reliable as the physicists once believed natural phenomena to be.<sup>52</sup>

Two important observations, explanatory of politics construed through social science, are offered in this passage. First, there is the new conjunction of image-making and problem-solving; politics, as Arendt so aptly has it, comes to be seen as public relations.<sup>53</sup> To be sure, the image of the political situation has inevitably been important to the political actor, especially in the case where he had to justify his act. The ancient importance of rhetoric as the political tool *par excellence* is adequate confirmation of this.<sup>54</sup> But the creation of the image in such a case seems to take place after the decision has been taken; it is *justification*. Now, in modern politics, image itself becomes a prior problem; a political decision is taken with a view to the image which will be presented. The modern equivalent of the rhetor's skill is a manipulation of this image, the illusion to be conveyed by the constituent's senses. Thus the problem-solving process is seen in terms of the need to predict citizens' possible reactions to any given, nominally political, action. This leads, secondly, to a comparison with the actual politics of an earlier age. The ancient politician, having taken a decision (solved a problem) and faced with the need to justify that action (*preserve* an image) needed a lively sense of the truth of the case, as well as an awareness of the several possible perspectives which might obtain within his own proper body-politic. His problem *a posteriori* was one of demonstrating that the perspective operative in his decision was at once the most perfectly correspondent to the reality, and the least impious. It seems that while the modern practice is designed to forestall debate, the ancient practice could only be furthered in debate.

The parallel development to the conjunction noted above has been the substitute of research for action. In the search for general laws of the political domain, arcane underlying general causes with some universal character are sought, to the exclusion of the obvious, immediate problem which is evident to all. An interesting peripheral concern has been an ever-waxing discussion of the nature of an immediate relation of theory and practice. Such *immediacy* is explicitly denied in earlier authors, such as Kant (as a modern example);<sup>55</sup> that there was some

mediation also seems implicit in the doctrines of both Greek and Roman commentators (such a mediation being, presumably, the virtue of the politician). In any event, as Arendt notes, to neglect the obvious political problem "means that the problem will not even be properly defined."<sup>56</sup>

It is not, of course, appropriate to the context of this inquiry to advance a solution to the knotty problems of methodology in the social sciences. Those problems are germane to this inquiry only insofar as the conflict over method is symptomatic of the fundamental inadequacy of the social sciences as presently constituted to address the question of what a city is. It is sufficient for the present project to notice that, regardless of the "ideological" strain of methodological theorizing, it is the sort of *predictive*, law-like structure which is sought. Such a demand for a more or less rigid determinism is most obvious in a naturalistic approach to the social sciences.<sup>57</sup> But even more phenomenologically informed inquiry into social reality, while avoiding the positive error of social-scientific naturalism, seems to strive for an "organized knowledge" which can serve as a certain guide to decision-making.<sup>58</sup> Insofar as the latter approach must take cognizance of the obvious, evident circumstances of social phenomena, it is more adequate than the merely naturalistic perspective (modelled as it is on an outdated positivistic natural science<sup>59</sup>). On the other hand, when such a phenomenology leans toward the supervention of the obvious, the criticisms of naturalism seem equally applicable.

But the shift in perspective which has produced the foregoing state of affairs is very much to the point. The Cartesian variant on the "turn within," coming to be the ground of method in subsequent thinkers, obscured "objective" reality, shifting the emphasis among criteria of truthfulness from correspondence between object and proposition, to more *interior* sorts of confirmation—coherence, notably, but also verifiability and material practicality. This shift is not even a mistake in any strong sense; the resultant facilitation of observation of the world from a universal perspective proved extremely productive. But as science, including social science,<sup>60</sup> has striven to become increasingly universal in perspective, the limited earthly concerns, the obvious defining characteristics of the human domain, are lost in the cosmic processes which are imposed as explanatory schemata upon the world. The result at times seems almost a revived astrology.<sup>61</sup>

Indeed, the very notion of process itself—a point upon which Descartes is insistent, in view of his emphasis on efficient causality,<sup>62</sup>—changes the character of social scientific inquiry in a definitive way.<sup>63</sup> The only process available to the social scientist has been the material process of accumulation, interpreted in various ways for various purposes. This process, in Arendt's expression, "was understood as a natural process and more specifically in the image of the life process itself."<sup>64</sup> In fact, a case can be made that the notion of process was imported into the physical sciences from this historical perspective.<sup>65</sup> Within such a framework of understanding, though, it is no longer possible to look at the being of an object. More to the point in the present inquiry, the city as the hypotyposis or symbol of a fundamental human activity, politics, is fatally obscured. The activity of citizens in an historically determined moment is lost in the desire to account for the generation of that moment, or more often, the generation of the place, in some sort of "materialized" history. This shift, in the particular case of cities, can be characterized as an emphasis upon the merely urban (having to do with the place in which certain people live, certain transactions take place, a location, in a word, resulting from certain processes, some of which are deemed virtually automatic), to the exclusion of political or civic actions by a body of citizens confronted by a need to make a decision. The evidence of this shift is legion.<sup>66</sup> It would be wrong to assert that all social scientists have succumbed to this, as I believe, erroneous perspective. But even where a criticism of the naturalistic account is evident, it is not wholly abandoned. In any received account of the modern city, the specifically civic is lost in the merely urban.<sup>67</sup>

The city comes to be seen, in this materialistic, naturalistic perspective, as a social order, "a system coordinating the behavior of many persons within a community."<sup>68</sup> The actions of citizens together—which constitute the difference between *civitas* and *urbs* in the ancient understanding of the city—are difficult to fix; it is more productive of something reducible to an explanation, to study the material structure. Such a structure is not obvious; thus it is necessary to define an ideal structure *a priori* and "retrofit" it upon the actual political body.

It is not that this perspective is altogether wrong. In accounting for the purely material element of the city, the distinctly *urban* aspect,

social scientific inquiries have amassed a significant body of data and advanced a number of different systems of coherent explanations, each of which sheds light upon what happens in urban situations. This has been amply shown in the previous chapters. Indeed, some of these theories seem to have a limited predictive value. However, it is equally true that these theories have been proven unevenly adequate, both as complete explanations of all phenomena, and as *regularly* predictive of coordinated actions of some bodies of citizens. Political actions and dependent phenomena occur in a fashion which frequently seems spontaneous, vitiating the social-scientific discovery of apparent regularities.

The frequent failure of social-scientific inquiry<sup>f</sup> to provide certain grounds, which implicitly it claims to do, would appear to justify another line of inquiry, tangential to the social-scientific, into the non-material, specifically civic, aspect of the city.

#### IV

*Process*<sup>69</sup> is the explanatory schema frequently employed in social-scientific accounts of society; some of this appears in the foregoing discussion of functionalist social science. Two kinds of process are asserted, usually exclusive of one another: either historical development or the internal interaction of a social system's elements is posited as a kind of principle.

The former mode of explanation by process is useful in the event one wishes to make a strictly causal account of the human social sphere, agreeable in manner to similar explanatory models in the natural sciences. Under this assumption, in the event a particular cause-effect relationship is established, it seems feasible to predict from similar causes similar effects. The practical limits to such a causal explanation are, of course, the detail with which the complex of causes "producing" a particular effect can be known, and the degree of similarity between two sets of causes for which an analogous relationship is claimed. These limits are acknowledged by the advocates of such an explanatory device.<sup>70</sup>

Strictly "naturalistic" causal explanation of society rests upon the not altogether deniable assumption that human society is natural. Compelling as this assumption is, there exists an antinomy, that human

beings create their own society, and reform it from time to time. History provides a number of examples of this kind of deliberate creative or re-creative act of individual or collective will to alter societies, which are incompatible with the claim that society is wholly determined naturalistically.

If the antinomy is assumed, *viz.* that human society creates itself, then the social scientist will prefer to examine the internal functional structure of society, as has been indicated in earlier remarks. It is asserted that necessary alterations to a given social fabric to accomplish some desired movement from an arbitrary originary "point zero" can be discovered in this structure. It would seem at first that this is a teleological perspective. However the *telos* treated of under this perspective does not seem to have the conscious, "autarchous" character of the *telos* of classical teleology. The more contemporary expression, "teleonomy," in which a purpose is understood as an efficient cause (presumably, in that it is a motivation inherent in the actor, hence actual and possible, rather than a conceived purpose, thus merely potential), seems more appropriate.<sup>71</sup> This is an enduring principle of explanation, so understood. As "progress," process is the most typical of liberal notions. Progress becomes the lens through which society is viewed, and it is amenable to measurement in material terms.

What is lost in this liberal notion of progress is a sense of variety, on the one hand, and of the appropriate, on the other.<sup>72</sup> If this progress is seen as being "in the direction of organized and assured freedom,"<sup>73</sup> then it is easy to overlook differences in social structures and see all kinds of social institutions as tending toward the same grand purpose.<sup>74</sup> But since one rather absolute goal is posited as the purpose of all these social (and especially, governmental) institutions, necessarily, any goal advanced which is not subsidiary to this absolute goal of greater freedom will be looked upon as reactionary. Such reactionary goals are the object of official repression.

There is a serious problem with the definition of the absolute goal of progress as freedom. Some non-material definition would be subject to a large degree of interpretive variation. Hence the tendency is to define freedom in economic and technological terms. That is, to be free is to have enough of specified basic goods which technology can produce through large-scale (and ever-increasing) production. That some ele-

ments in society might seek to impose limits upon the economic-technological notion of progress can provoke a technological advocate to exclaim:

Indeed, the central danger facing humankind lies . . . in the subordination of technology to the values of earlier historical eras and its exploitation by those who do not understand its implications and consequences but seek only their own selfish personal or group purposes.<sup>75</sup>

Process, in order to be comprehensible as an explanatory principle, seems to require being imposed upon the human social domain in the form of an absolute notion of progress. It may be defined, as above, in economic and technological terms, or it may be "retrofitted" to a more naturalistic explanation: it might be argued that greater populations living in smaller (both relatively and absolutely—through population expansion and progressive urbanization) territories, served as the principle cause of the growth of ever more sophisticated production. The net result appears the same; the grand process and its goal, accepted as the explanation of the human social domain, comes to be the tool of the new politician. This politician, as we noticed above, is concerned with justifying his actions *a priori*. Process comes to be the principle of such justification; actions which accord with process, seen as progress, are proper, and the opposition from any quarter to such progress can be called anything from counter-productive to treasonable. The body-politic is material to be ordered in the most perfect fashion conducive to the attainment of process, understood as progress. Since the body-politic is composed of people, and this redefinition is a materialistic one, human being is now material to be organized. Terms such as "human resources," "manpower development," and the like, government policies favoring certain kinds of population growth, training programs, and social services over others are ample evidence of this development of manipulation of the human social domain and the people constituting it, on the one hand, and of the character of this manipulation "from above," on the other.<sup>76</sup>

Practically, this manipulation cannot be accomplished without some view as to what is happening within the society itself. This is necessary

for two reasons: In the first place, the manipulation is justified on the grounds of keeping society as a whole on the "main track" toward the adumbrated goal as *the* social purpose. In the second place (more pragmatically), short of an absolute and largely unworkable sort of tyranny, a government's legitimate authority rests to some extent upon the view its subjects entertain of its efficacy in addressing obvious and immediate problems.

Government responds most actively to those demands which are most forcefully and unavoidably pressed. Hannah Arendt, discussing changes in the university community (whose officers are clearly "establishment" persons), describes this responsiveness succinctly:

It seems that the academic establishment, in its tendency to yield more to Negro demands, even if they are clearly silly and outrageous, than to disinterested and usually highly moral claims of white rebels, feels more comfortable when confronted with interests plus violence than when it is a matter of nonviolent "participatory democracy." The yielding of university authorities to black demand has often been explained by the "guilt feeling" of the white community; I think it is more likely that faculty as well as administrations and boards of trustees are half-consciously aware of the obvious truth of a conclusion of the official *Report on Violence in America*: "Force and violence are likely to be successful techniques of social control and persuasion when they have had wide popular support."<sup>77</sup>

To this must be added the indications from earlier discoveries, that "wide popular support" is a relative notion. A small absolute number in a limited territory—even a statistically insignificant number—can effect its will. It has been suggested that one or two hundred thousand people, loudly demonstrating their support for some action demanded of city government in New York, can effectively compel the city to take some step which is not widely supported among the remaining five or six million citizens.<sup>78</sup>

Manipulation of this sort is an omnipresent fact of modern society,

subject to limitations indicated elsewhere. Manipulators—elected officials, bureaucrats, or persons consulted in the policy formation process—are themselves subject to manipulation from below. But this latter sort of manipulation works only when perceived as threatening, or as "violent." Such violence, it can be argued, arises from a degree of frustration, though that argument is suspect given the complexity of the "violent" people and the groups they form. Perhaps it is more accurate to say violence erupts (suggesting thereby spontaneity) claiming the purpose of redressing an obvious problem, and to admit that "deep" causes are at best obscure.

Concomitant with this insistence on the violence of modern manipulation is recognition of the relative inefficacy of what would seem to be preferred means in the manipulation of bodies-politic from above. The "hidden persuaders" of advertising and public relations experts seem to have proven increasingly ineffective as vehicles of political manipulation. The sheer omni-presence of these manipulative media—television foremost among them—has produced in the body of people increasingly exposed to their blandishments a sophistication in critically evaluating some of the perspectives purveyed.<sup>79</sup>

This is not to say attitudes present in a given society, or desires developing within it, are not concretized and even potentiated through these media. But it often seems more the case that media personalities—frequently accused of informing public opinion, often in biased fashion—are merely giving expression to a common perspective. This is surely not manipulative; the *actually* manipulative, the attempt to "sell," in a manner akin to the selling of a breakfast cereal, an establishment opinion, is necessarily manipulative insofar as the position being advanced is foreign to the group subjected to the manipulative effort. This latter kind of manipulation seems of only limited efficacy. Therefore the political manipulator is compelled to fall back upon more traditional means of manipulation—physical coercion, torture, deliberately misleading the body-politic through adjustments of information and education, etc.. These violent methods—parallel to those employed "from below" have obvious and historically demonstrated drawbacks.

It would seem this is the case, at this point in the study:

1. There is a body of data on cities deriving from social-scientific inquiry; to this is attached a complex of interpretations.

2. These interpretations embody certain assumptions which have a history. That history has been mentioned in this chapter.
3. The most primitive assumption in the social-scientific study of cities is one of *process* interpreted as *progress*. This in turn is not merely an hermeneutic assumption, but a normative one, linking speculative inquiry with morality.<sup>80</sup>

The development within liberal circles of a notion of progress, manifesting in the social sciences as a principle of process, is of limited usefulness. As a strictly explanatory theory, process can prove illuminating in the inquiry into some aspects of the social domain. But as a principle of political practice, or a criterion by which political actions are assessed, process is productive of a kind of manipulation which is non-, if not actually counterproductive. The kind of manipulation which the liberal political operator attempts in order to keep the society he operates (from a distance, as it were, in accordance with the posture of objectivity consistent with the modern scientific viewpoint) on the proper track toward the specified goal, characterized as a carrot-and-stick method,<sup>81</sup> has proven ineffective. The resultant fall-back into traditional manipulative means seems, both on historical and nominally logical grounds, likely to prove at least equally counterproductive.<sup>82</sup> Practically speaking, one is compelled to examine the (possibly unpalatable) alternatives, which are political bodies in which the *a priori* justification of action, and the manipulation of the body-politic thereby at least tacitly advocated, are avoided.

## V

It seems to me the social sciences, as presently constituted, do not serve in the sort of inquiry now indicated. This need not be a reflection upon some putative inadequacy of social science as received. Their basic assumptions, characterized above, have produced a great deal of data of material import for this inquiry. But the subject is infinitely complex, and it would appear that the fundamental assumptions of the social sciences do not readily comprehend that complexity.

Josiah Royce describes the complexity of human society in terms of

tension, of "strained situations," and argues that it is in such social tension that one comes to observe himself as distinct from others with whom one is in contact.<sup>83</sup> Such social tension arises from the stress engendered by the unpredictability of another's actions in specific "crisis" circumstances. In reality, that is, the response of any given person to a social nexus in which a decision is demanded depends to a large extent upon how that nexus is judged. The judgment, in turn, depends upon who is making the judgment, and the whole complex of previous events and decisions taken which constitutes his personal history. Such a personal history is necessarily unique to some extent, and precisely to that extent the response of any given person or group will be unique. The contrast between the response one individual expects he would respond, and his perception of how another has responded has a dual effect. The first individual comes to understand his difference from the other as necessary, at the same time discovering a communal identity which makes the comparison possible. As part of this identity/difference discovery, he becomes aware of his own complex of inculcated habits of conduct, plans, ideals and willfulness. His response to the action of the other is expressed in a judgment of the form, "I would have done otherwise," or perhaps "It could not have been done otherwise."

There must be sufficient similarity among the members of a social body to allow of coordinated actions. While some kind of seemingly phylogenetic motivation may be assumed in standard social-scientific analyses, it is still conventional to assume that coordinated action arises through volition, and that a common will in turn comes about through deliberation in which the manifold judgments of persons in community are reconciled. In deliberation, ever so slight divergent personal histories manifest; surely, the larger the number of persons, or indeed, of groups, the greater the complexity and the more involved the reconciliation.

Max Weber makes a strong case that this complexity is fundamental in understanding the differences in various kinds of urban culture. He argues that Western urbanites (at least, in the Mediterranean basin) enjoyed a peculiar freedom to present typically Asian urbanites. He attributes this to the absence of "social formations" preventing fusion into more or less homogeneous status groups.<sup>84</sup> That is, Western

civic society lacks at least one level of mediation between society and government—a dubious view, given concepts such as ethnicity and like factionalism. However, the presence of such mediating groups, with various degrees of shared personal histories, seems in his opinion to have prevented the emergence of a common civic perspective. Moreover, in places where the city was of less importance (in Weber's view), the evolution beyond such mediating groups was also of less significance. While Weber's formulation is itself suspect (there is a suspicion of ethnocentricity appropriate to any line of thinking founded in post-Kantian German idealism, I believe), it does seem the case that successive breakdowns in primaevial kinship groupings in the ancient cities of the Mediterranean basin was a prerequisite to the full-blown emergence of civic consciousness. This consciousness was regularly expressed in some sort of deliberative assembly, itself evolved seemingly from precivic institutions, in which common opinion was forged from a complex of private views. The evolution of tribal into national assemblies (as in the case of the ancient German *Thing*), and eventually modern civic councils and magisterial diets, is not dissimilar.<sup>85</sup>

To this tendency to deliberative formation of common opinions, there is a regularly occurring counter-tendency, in which even those communities normally practicing some sort of deliberation restrict the roles of some people in such deliberation. Not all persons present to the community are in the community. Such people are not among the "saved" or are not "citizens," or are otherwise debilitated. One example of this sort of restriction is to be found in the ancient *polis* as Aristotle presents it in the *Politics*;<sup>86</sup> certainly the Christian notion of the community saved by acceptance of a particular conception of God, or alternatively, by a selective operation of God's grace, is another.<sup>87</sup>

The difficulty of moving into the *terra incognita* of a theory about cities beyond that vouchsafed by the received doctrines of the social sciences is therefore increased. Not only will such a theory have to account for the way in which deliberation takes place in the city, but it will have to take into account restrictive qualifications for participation in that deliberation. Any number of qualifications seems possible, and it is a relevant question how much of the determination is necessary, and how much an accident of culture.<sup>88</sup> One would expect that a community with more inclusive criteria for participation in the deliberative process

would have greater difficulty in founding a consensus, and thus have a more restricted field of approved action than a community in which a smaller number of divergent opinions needed to be reconciled.

The enormous complexity of the human social domain, and the lack of ready definition to the law-like regularities of that domain, is fairly well accepted. Morgenbesser, for instance, suggests: "The problem is not whether the social sciences *can* contain laws but whether they can contain enough laws *or* theories to enable them to be used for certain tasks."<sup>89</sup> Eliade, from within the social sciences, simply eliminates the accounts of some kinds of development in human perspective and communal understanding;<sup>90</sup> typically, the social scientific account of human society is limited in a way calculated to avoid the complex fact.

On the other hand, when an attempt is made to extend the social scientific apparatus beyond its limits for handling complexity of the kinds noted above, the response is far from univocal. There may be an even closer alliance between the social scientist and the political operator which results in such an attempted extension, in which process is seen as utterly objective and necessary. The social scientist becomes, under such a scenario an advocate of process and implicit goal; he is called to step beyond simple inquiry into human society.<sup>91</sup> But those outside the alliance, disenfranchised by it, come to perceive "that 'the Establishment' is out of its mind."<sup>92</sup>

Thus it seems there is a complexity involved in moving beyond the kinds of explanation afforded of cities by social science; this complexity is such that the social scientific apparatus cannot effectively address it. In the event it does transgress the limits of its method, moving from observation and description into the realm of action, it is coopted. This is not consistent with the need for objectivity. Moreover, there is some reason to believe the doctrine the social scientist turned social technologist will be called upon to advocate is inadequate to the realm of action.

## VI

It will be apparent that there is a perceptible difficulty in the social scientific discussion of communities in general and cities in particular. These difficulties are historical, having to do with assumptions built into the social sciences, which actually antedate their formation. They are

methodological, having to do with limits imposed by those assumptions upon the social sciences. Such difficulties can actually preclude consideration of the city as a discrete entity in the way this study is intended to do: "The utility of the legal-social definition of the city is at an end . . . The city has no separate existence and therefore no interest for the social scientist."<sup>93</sup> This is not a universally held opinion, but that it should have any credence at all is disturbing, especially in view of waxing urbanization world-wide.<sup>94</sup>

In any event, the assumptions which are operative in most social scientific doctrines—most especially what I believe to be the fundamental doctrine, of process—are inadequate to the project of understanding the city as this project aims to understand it. The actual political event is obscured; its uniqueness is submerged in the functional whole when process acquires "a monopoly of universality and significance."<sup>95</sup> This kind of theorizing, as was suggested above, does not ally itself with practice; it supplants practice.

Focus on structure, a focus prominent for as much as a century,<sup>96</sup> is intricately linked with liberalism. As "progress," process has a history going back to the origins of modern thought. With the waxing of liberal political theory, politics itself disappeared. That is, the notion of deliberative reconciliation of many opinions, founding action by bodies politic was lost in the imposition by political operators of *a priori*-justified activities grounded in a social technology based on process. But suppose the thesis of this inquiry is correct, that the concept of process founding modern social science and technology is inadequate to the reality of the human social domain: then it would seem on the one hand no regularly predictive and explanatory theory should be expected. Moreover, the technology so founded, relying on persuasion by "hidden means," consistent with a functionalist understanding of society, will fail to engender widespread acceptance of *a priori*-justified activities of political operators. Violence within the body politic as a norm of policy-making activity would be an expected alternative, and the flourishing of such violence suggests the correctness of the thesis. This failure of the evident ground of liberal political action, and the concomitant failure of liberalism leaves room for the kind of inquiry, aimed beyond and supplementing social scientific doctrines of the human social domain, toward which this study is directed.<sup>97</sup>

The next step, then, in this inquiry into cities, is to set up some kind of general theory of political community more plausibly adequate to the reality of cities. It will leave a number of problems unresolved, since I am constitutionally limited to a determinedly Western approach to the problem.

The basic assumption will be the possible existence of common opinion, reached in deliberation. This is an old notion in Western political theory, and seems to have cognate forms in some non-Western cultures.<sup>98</sup> This assumption rests on the belief that something specifically human is at work in deliberation; common opinion and the deliberation through which it is formed takes place in language, a human attribute, and deed.<sup>99</sup> It is a god-like attribute, in ancient opinion, an evidence of human excellence.<sup>100</sup> Through such an assumption, it should be possible to make the city show itself, from within itself.<sup>101</sup>

It appears, finally, that the proper response to Bacon's criticism of the "failure of intellectuals to generate a viable concept of a modern city," quoted above, is to admit the charge, and abandon to some extent the non-productive intellectual apparatus which, as has been shown, obscured the human society of which the city is symbol. This does not mean giving up useful insights; it means the judicious adoption of such insights, while at the same time adopting a more productive integrating conception.

## VII

In the ensuing study, I am interested in summarizing the social scientific data about cities, and adding to it some considerations which, as I understand it, are nominally outside their proper areas of investigation. The social sciences, being utterly modern in their character, are limited by the modern prejudice to consideration of efficient causality (while at the same time, on Humian grounds, being somewhat doubtful about the *nature* of efficient causality), and an assumption of material causality—there is something *there* to be described, after all. These limitations preclude meaningful discussion of formal and final matters, though; despite a growing interest in final causality as a mode of explanation, this remains a "minority opinion." But from a philosophical ground, it should be possible to supply a proximate perspective on these

“unfashionable” causal elements; it should be possible to conjoin them with social-scientific data, producing a more complete picture of what cities are. This will, to be sure, not answer all questions about cities (a very large task, probably not ever done until cities cease to exist). It may solve certain difficulties in present examinations relevant to the future developments of cities.

Foremost of the specifically philosophical concerns in this inquiry is the tension between privacy as that has come to be understood in late-modernity and the social domain proper. I think Hannah Arendt has captured the sharpness of the polarity:

... It seems even more important that modern privacy is at least as sharply opposed to the social realm—unknown to the ancients who considered its content a private matter—as it is to the political, properly speaking. The intimacy of the heart, unlike the private household, has no tangible place in the world, nor can the society against which it protests and asserts itself be localized with the same certainty as the public space . . . The modern individual and his endless conflicts, his inability either to be at home in society or to live outside it altogether, his ever-changing moods and the radical subjectivism of his emotional life, was born in this rebellion of the heart.<sup>102</sup>

That is, the tension which we today find between ourselves as private persons and members of society is something which belongs to our time. A private domain existed in the past, certainly; as private, it was not speculated upon in any great degree in classical antiquity. In Western thinking, it would appear to have arisen only in the post-classical epoch, reaching an acme in Plotinus and the fathers of the Church, subsiding and arising again in the outbreaks of personal religion in the Middle Ages. In the modern epoch, however, a dual condition—the demand for a social science, parallel to natural science, and *absent* the seeming imprecision of politics, and the corresponding waning of strictly *political* bodies and institutions—has produced a largely secular individualism, which is wide-spread. The manifestation of this is the new sort of social

rebellion, which is not of social bodies, but of like-minded individuals whose coalition is merely temporary and conditioned by momentary consensus. The image is not unlike that posited by early-modern social-contract thinkers as the situation obtaining before the initiation of the social contract.

This tension contravenes what Peirce called “the catholic consent which constitutes the truth.”<sup>103</sup> This tension is a wholly subjective phenomenon in all the senses of that much abused expression. Insofar as it results in a focus upon the individual as sensing, as being the only sure receiver for himself, of information, it tends to deny, if not the possibility, the meaningfulness of the public consensus upon what is true, a consensus which extends both temporally and spatially beyond one’s own present self (and which is therefore more than utterly subjective). This is no new theme in modern thinking; that most preeminent of modern thinkers, of whose doctrine it is not too much to say it is the frame of all subsequent thought, both at the sophisticated level of the Academy and more vulgar venues, Kant, “was disturbed by the alleged arbitrariness and subjectivity of *de gustibus non disputandum est* (which, no doubt, is true for private idiosyncracies), for this arbitrariness offended his political and not his aesthetic sense.”<sup>104</sup> Kant devoted the first part of his *Critique of Judgment* to a demonstration of how seemingly subjective remarks of taste advanced their claim to universality, overcoming the subjectivity which seems to be their necessary status. That taste is at the very least similar to prudence (a political form of judgment)—if not indeed a species of prudence—is simply evidenced in the various references to taste as, e.g., determinations in freedom, or as involving common perceptions, in the prefix and first part of the third critique.<sup>105</sup>

This fundamental division between individuals, this sense of difference from others and eventually, from oneself (the famous “identity crisis”), results in a crisis of communication. Kant thinks it is through the judgment of taste (and hence, prudential judgments) that the ability to communicate innermost feelings, and to sympathize with one’s fellow man, are manifested.<sup>106</sup> Royce responds by noting that, in the final analysis, “sympathy may try its best to bridge the gulf . . . [but] the physical sundering of the organisms corresponds to a persistent sundering of immediate feelings.”<sup>107</sup> In short, being-individual, which

as a problem becomes extraordinarily omnipresent in late modernity, so that it can no longer be ignored, is a necessary part of the human condition. As such, *it has always represented a contradiction in civic existence.*

Thus the separation of man from himself is indirectly a part of the inquiry at hand, into the form and purpose of cities as preeminent human dwelling places. The separation of the individual from others with whom he is in society, while *not* being in community (advancing a distinction to be defined below), is a material problem both to the understanding of cities, and to any normative remarks about them. Since cities are communal dwelling-places—men live together in them, in one way or another—the purposiveness expressed in cities is a communal purposiveness; hindrances to such communal purposiveness, as concealing an element of the causal structure of cities, become obstacles to the inquiry I am undertaking.

Along with this general problem of the separation of individual and communal matrix, and man from himself, the very nature of “the public” becomes an issue. The disappearance or mutation beyond recognition of such a domain is commonly accepted; mass culture is one way of speaking about it, as is the commonly accepted expression, “faceless cipher.”<sup>108</sup> What is less often taken up is the implications for the *possibility* of thinking about the public domain—we continue to speak of it as if we had a clear idea of what it is, though this is perhaps not so. If the status of the individual is murky—as our concern with it may suggest—and the public domain is defined in part in relation or in contrast to the individual, then there is a difficulty.

In this problem of individual and matrix there is also the fulfillment of what Heidegger has called “The Age of the World Picture.”<sup>109</sup> Hannah Arendt has contrasted the ancient world’s conception of a static and immortal world, in which such a viewpoint was not meaningful, with the modern notion of a world in process, where point-of-view is essential to its understanding:

The experience which underlies the modern age’s notion of process, unlike the experience underlying the ancient notion of immortality, is by no means primarily an experience which man made in the world surrounding him;

on the contrary, it sprang from the despair of ever experiencing and knowing adequately all that is given to man and not made by him. Against this despair, modern man summoned up the full measure of his own capacities; despairing of ever finding truth through mere contemplation, he began to try out his capacities for action, and by doing so he could not help becoming aware that wherever man acts he starts processes.<sup>110</sup>

To understand the shift in perspective this represents, one must notice the ways in which it is connected with the ancient matrixing of individual and community, as well as the changes which have happened. The important connection, I believe, is the extension of human experience to the natural world about him; in the pre-Socratics, this resulted in the search for natural conventions like those *nomoi* which obtained in the city (and which had seemed to exist only there, in contradistinction to the chaos of nature). With full development of the concept of the individual, and the coincident development of the nation-state, modern technological strategies in the physical sciences, the emergence of a *bourgeois* ruling class, and a profusion of social and scientific revolutions, a change in this attitude seems to have resulted in a demand for a social technology (parallel to the physical technologies) which would allow the *imposition* of order on society in the same way order was imposed on the natural world. In short, the empirical attitude of antiquity was replaced by what might be called an “engineering approach,” taking its cue from the engineering of the world commencing in the late 16th century and continuing to the present.

In classical antiquity (after the shift from a prephilosophical attitude), the way of encountering the world was of natural man encountering a larger, more permanent matrix within which the human matrix operated—in ways not dissimilar from the more immediate matrix of the city. In modernity, human being is conceived in Western thought as not entirely natural (natural law being in various senses antecedent to humanity’s being-saved). It operates a world from outside it; it engineers that world to its requirements; it seeks to make its own matrix in the same way. But the most casual observation of this activity of the individual making his own world, his own community (arranging to be

in *this* relationship, eschewing *that* one) reveals the continuous character of such a management involvement with one's world, and the relative character of any examination of such a world. If it be admitted that there is a *common* world as a matrix shared with others, then "world view" is an accurate expression of the modern attitude, deriving directly from the pervasiveness of individuality in modernity. Partial confirmation of this description is the extraordinary *tolerance* with which human beings today accept other peoples' actions and beliefs about the common space, so long as such notions do not manifestly interfere with one's own opinions.

To the difficulties attendant upon a discussion of cities—as they are today, constituted by the waxing importance of the individual and his "management" or "engineering" of the society in which he lives from outside it, a third might be action *propter se*. The city is the principle human venue of action; it is also its most obvious product, insofar as it is more than a merely chance agglomeration.

Yet action is a topic largely neglected in modern Western thought. Insofar as modern Western thought rests upon a foundation in mediaeval interpretations of late classical antiquity, compounded by a priority for the theoretical management of the world in which one exists, the hierarchy of contemplation over action is accepted uncritically. To be sure, the demand for action is often expressed; the common response is to seek a period of reflection in which some idea as to what action is appropriate may emerge—a "blue ribbon panel" or an "executive committee" studies the problem, offering a commentary and various alternative actions which seem likely to address the problem. Or one sees a new academic field created to propose general principles—business, heretofore a domain of action in response to market demands, becomes a highly theoretical enterprise. In the arts and sciences, the contemplative faculties—mind and sensory apparatus, conditions of the possibility of thinking things out, modeling faculties—supplant the empirical *cum* active-deontic in social science and philosophy as matters of study.

All these factors require careful consideration, because as they stand now in modernity, they preclude a view of what the city is. The city is a principally political entity in the strict sense; it has within it a certain spontaneity. This spontaneity, which is a political/empirical fact,<sup>111</sup> —

differentiating the political domain from the natural domain, and political reason from that appropriate to the natural sciences—is on the one hand a product of the city's origin in common action, and on the other hand, is maintained by the city's on-going need for active renewal as its circumstances alter.

### VIII

The purpose of this inquiry is to learn what a city is; as has been indicated, part of the study will summarize what the social sciences have to say about cities, offering interpretations of that data and those opinions. But it should be clear by now that modern social science, powerful as it is in many ways, is largely—and seemingly by its own admission—inadequate to the chore of defining the city. It circumscribes the matter, without quite striking center.

Of course, if I am correct, and the city is as Aristotle has suggested the quintessential human *synthesis topos*, then the answer to the question I am posing is already understood primordially. Such an originary intuition is not the most satisfactory kind of knowledge, though. What is wanted is an expressible explanation of what is known, insofar as that may be possible within limits of knowledge and language.

Traditionally, that knowledge which comports with explanation is a knowledge of causes. Aristotle offers the following definition of "cause:"

"Cause" means (1) that from which (as immanent material) a thing comes into being, e.g., the bronze of the statue and the silver of the saucer, and the classes which include these. (2) The form or pattern, i.e. the formula of the essence and the classes which include this (e.g. the ratio 2:1 and number in general are the causes of the octave) and the parts of the formula. (3) That from which the change or the freedom from change first begins, e.g. the advisor is a cause of action, and the father a cause of the child, and in general the maker the cause of the thing made and the change-producing of the changing. (4) The end, i.e., that for the sake of which a

thing is, e.g., health is a cause of walking . . . These then are practically all the senses in which causes are spoken of, and as they are spoken of in several senses it follows that there are several causes of the same thing . . ."<sup>112</sup>

The causes are named, respectively, material cause, formal cause, efficient cause, and final cause.<sup>113</sup> It is clear that a thing has several causes, the primacy of any one being dependent upon the momentary perspective of the observer. The kind of knowledge of the city with which this inquiry is concerned must—if it is to be reasonably complete—be cognizant of all these aspects and their causes.

This traditional opinion, which reflects the complexity of the actual and potential world about us, has suffered a degree of rejection in modernity. Whole classes of causality are largely rejected, as has been suggested above, from scholarly and scientific consideration. This is almost a precisely datable event; Descartes' rejection of final cause on the ground that God alone can actually know that for the sake of which anything is, seems possible only after the reassertion in Calvinist doctrine of the nominally Augustinian conception of absolute predestination consistent with God's omniscience. With the rejection of the possibility of knowing that for the sake of which something is, the possibility of completely comprehending the form of something (in rather Heideggerian language, the co-responsibility of end and form for the thing is disrupted) is rendered *impossible*. Effectively, after the nominal revolution in thought that is coincident with the advent of modernity, one can only know a thing scientifically in a partial way. Only two of the general classes of causes are recognized, specifically the material cause (implicitly) and the efficient cause (explicitly). Efficient cause is given preeminence.<sup>114</sup> Causal chains—the list of movements and correlative movers—become the principle, if not the only, kind of explanation.

This prejudice for certain kinds of causal explanation is evident in standard accounts of cities, as will be seen below. Much of the standard literature offers what may be characterized as "material" descriptions of the city—descriptions of the geography, design, and so on which make up the physical urban habitat. Some of these material descriptions

are historical; others claim to be non-historical and essential.<sup>115</sup> Other accounts offer descriptions of the way things change, or are kept from changing, in cities; these clearly fulfill the rubric for "efficient" descriptions of cities. Again, some are historical, and some are essential.<sup>116</sup>

Therefore the situation seems to be this: two parts of a complete account of the city have been provided in the usual social-scientific literature about cities and related material. But it appears that this discussion as it stands is not sufficient; our understanding of cities as they are today is inadequate to the reality, and the evidence of this is simply the unsatisfactory condition of city life and an inability to address what is unsatisfactory. Since it is clear that only two parts of a complete account are presently available, it seems that a likely first step in addressing the inadequacy of present knowledge of the subject, is supplying the missing elements of a complete causal account. Moreover, even in the event that this first contemporary attempt filling the gaping hole left by standard social-scientific accounts prove not altogether successful—as is quite possible, given both the limited scope of the project and the difficulty of the topic—at least heuristically, the approach is bound to link concepts hitherto considered only separately.

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## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> To better understand what I mean by history, please see my remarks in "Hermeneutic Philosophy: History as the Singular Ground of Thought," in *Cogito*, June, 1983, p. 90 *passim*.

<sup>2</sup> "In some cases," because there are some city cultures which have completely disappeared from historical view. The Indus Valley, e.g., produced a rich and powerful trading community, with a sophisticated city-based civilization. It was wiped out from memory, it seems. The archaeology of this culture, *absent* a tradition of its history, is barren indeed.

<sup>3</sup> Not that such transactions are interesting, so much as that the picture they present of a civilization is only partial.

<sup>4</sup> As for example the Arab nomads adopted the mode of Arabian cities' record keeping to record their experience of the desert.

<sup>5</sup> It is interesting to notice two unrelated data in this context: (1) The development of a system of writing in China which is neutral vis-a-vis speech, so that it is not truly possible to speak of a written Chinese *language*, having reference to the characters (cf.) DeFrancis, *Beginning Chinese*: New Haven (Yale), 1983; p. xxi, "Language and Wri-

ting"). This results, apparently, in an almost absolute transmittability of ancient texts, so that a modern Chinese can read an ancient text with only minimal familiarity with variant calligraphy and literary convention. (2) It appears in more sophisticated oral traditions, what is transmitted is couched in an archaic, stabilized, formalized tongue, e.g., Sanskrit or Pali. The effect is of a school boy learning his Latin—the quotations will stay with him forever. But such a technique appears necessarily elitist.

<sup>6</sup> This applies in the Western philosophical tradition; how true this might be in non-Western traditions of thought is a matter open to inquiry.

<sup>7</sup> This would appear to agree with Aristotle's second argument for the existence of the city as natural: *Politics* 1253a 10ff.

<sup>8</sup> H.W. Eldredge, *Taming Megalopolis*: Garden City (Doubleday), 1967; I, p. 3. This remark is truly wonderful; it at once displays the problem, and the reason the solution for the problem cannot be found.

<sup>9</sup> Scott Greer, *The Emerging City*: New York (Free Press), 1962; p. 6.

<sup>10</sup> Robert E. Park & Ernest W. Burgess, *The City*: Chicago (U. Chicago), 1967; p. ix (Janowitz's introduction).

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> Greer catalogues these opinions; *op. cit.*, p. 14.

<sup>13</sup> The perception is a common one; e.g., cf. Eldredge, *op. cit.*, p. 14. The interpretations offered of the perception are far from uniform or satisfactory, however.

<sup>14</sup> The priority of the city itself is another problem, quite interesting and demanding attention, but beyond the scope of this essay. Propriety demands that cognizance be taken of the varying status of the city, especially in cultures where the city is a by-product rather than an intended goal.

<sup>15</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*: New York (Macmillan), 1962; p. 132. I am assuming that Hobbes is not the least interested in city-states, but of course in the problems presented by the Commonwealth which had supplanted the Kingdom. Hobbes was a puissant "Greek"—his Thucydides is still in print and well received—and as such would be quite aware of the theory of the city-state. Both his own studies and the influence of classical literature in his society as a whole would encourage him to adapt this theoretical base to the new situation. This was even more the case for such writers as Bodin or Machiavelli (the latter living in a city-state in process of becoming the Grand Duchy of Tuscany).

<sup>16</sup> The imperial Roman provincial administration was municipal; cf. Pirenne, *A History of Europe*. Mediaeval cities also regularly received unusual degrees of freedom.

<sup>17</sup> E.g., cf. M. Gordon, *Sick Cities*: Baltimore (Penguin), 1965; p. 355.

<sup>18</sup> E.g., the enormous concern for a satisfactory definition of a citizen is obvious in the relevant works of Aristotle & Plato. It becomes a theological matter for Augustine.

<sup>19</sup> As one example, Oklahoma City.

<sup>20</sup> M. Meyerson (ed.), *The Conscience of the City*: New York, (Braziller), 1970; p. 2.

<sup>21</sup> There is an element of the mythical in this. For instance, Los Angeles has only a partial transport net, and one but poorly diversified. New cities in L.D.C.'s typically are unique and not part of a vast metro area.

<sup>22</sup> This would appear to be in confirmation of a somewhat Heideggerian position, that one can reflect and investigate only those questions for which answers are already prefigured in consciousness.

<sup>23</sup> For instance, some notion of unjust government, usurped government, or tyranny is advanced, often with appropriate remedies. This does not mean that an "Aristotelian," vaguely liberal, middle-class model is universal. But it is interesting to notice how

long aristocratic city-states not dissimilar survived in northern India; cf. R. Thapar, *A History of India I*: New York (Penguin); *passim*.

<sup>24</sup> Hannah Arendt, *Between Past And Future*: New York (Viking), 1961: p. 25. Cf. Arendt, *The Human Condition*: Chicago (U.Chicago), 1950; p. 270 and Eric Vogelin, *The New Science of Politics*: Chicago (U.Chicago), 1952; p. 26.

<sup>25</sup> It is a simple fact that Western European political thinking, with its emphasis on the economic, is for all intents and purposes the only kind commonly thought today. One striking confirmation of this is the remark in a recent television documentary, that the Saudi government saw development as requiring the formation of an urban bourgeoisie. Cf. Heilbroner, *The Great Ascent*: New York (HarRow), 1961; *passim*.

<sup>26</sup> *Vid. infra*, III, IV.

<sup>27</sup> Max Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization*: New York (Free Press), 1964; p. 100.:

<sup>28</sup> Such occurred in special places set aside on cities of the past—the forum, the agora, or the square before the city hall of mediaeval cities.

<sup>29</sup> Weber, *loc. cit.*

<sup>30</sup> Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

<sup>31</sup> *Principles of Philosophy*, XXVII, *passim*.

<sup>32</sup> *Vid. infra*, chapter 4 *et seq.*

<sup>33</sup> E.N. Bacon, "Urban Process," in Mayerson, *op. cit.*

<sup>34</sup> E.g., the citation of Studinski in Gordon, *op. cit.*

<sup>35</sup> Something of the same inability at a national level seems to provoke Arendt in *Crises of the Republic*: New York, 1972; cf. p. 37 *passim*.

<sup>36</sup> Leo Strauss's appendix in Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*: New Brunswick (Rutgers), 1976; p. 82. The obfuscation of the political, first a concealing of the political domain, is carried out necessarily by a liberal social science through its attendant social technology. One may question Strauss's remark that this does not finally kill the political.

<sup>37</sup> The term "symbol" is used as Kant defines it in the *Critique of Judgment* (New York (Hafner), 1951), p. 197.

<sup>38</sup> Aristotle, *Politics*, esp. books I and II.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. Descartes, *Discourse on the Method*, paragraph 4.

<sup>40</sup> Robert Heilbroner, *The Worldly Philosophers*: New York (S&S), 1967; p. 188ff.

<sup>41</sup> Arendt, *The Human Condition*, note p. 183.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.* p. 11.

<sup>43</sup> Prof. Harold Donohue suggests a well-developed rejection of teleology obtained in the later Epicurean schools.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. *Discourse*, part I.

<sup>45</sup> Arendt, *Between Past and Future*, p. 55.

<sup>46</sup> It is, perhaps, perplexing that the most "Empirical" and analytic thinkers of the early 20th century, insisting on a rejection of British idealism in particular and idealism in general, were nevertheless dominated by idealist notions. E.g., Wittgenstein's world is composed of "facts."

<sup>47</sup> Arendt, *Between Past & Future*, p. 53.

<sup>48</sup> See Mark Elvin, *Pattern of The Chinese Past*: Palo Alto (S.U.P.), 1973; Chpt. 4.

<sup>49</sup> H.G. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*: New York (Seabury), 1975; p. 81 *passim*.

<sup>50</sup> Arendt, *Crises of the Republic*, p. 6f.

<sup>51</sup> The most evident substantiation of this is the relative ascendancy of verifiability, coherence, and to a lesser extent, pragmatic criteria of truth over the older demand for objective correspondence. Cf. Pepper, *World Hypotheses* (U. Cal.); definitions of "data" and "danda."

<sup>52</sup> Arendt, *Crises of the Republic*, p. 11.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 10.

<sup>54</sup> This opinion enjoyed wide acceptance through the 16th century; Shakespeare's political characters are masterful rhetors, e.g..

<sup>55</sup> Cf. *Critique of Pure Reason*, B824f.

<sup>56</sup> Arendt, *Crises of the Republic*, p. 73.

<sup>57</sup> Morgenbesser, in Emmet & MacIntyre, *Sociological Theory and Philosophical Analysis*: N.Y. (Macmillan), 1970; pp. 23, 28 *passim*.

<sup>58</sup> Schütz in Emmet & MacIntyre, *ibid.* p. 5f; points of agreement with naturalistic social science are set out on p. 3.

<sup>59</sup> Legitimate, if the implicit social-scientific claim to unification with natural science in some sort of methodological common field is accepted, at least as an heuristic.

<sup>60</sup> See e.g., Ayer's comments on sociology in *Language, Truth & Logic*; compare Popper's (equally obsolete) discussion in various places, and attempts to apply these approaches in Hempel's *Aspects of Scientific Explanation* and criticisms in Hübner's *Kritik der Wissenschaftlichen Vernunft*.

<sup>61</sup> Arendt, *The Human Condition*, p. 268.

<sup>62</sup> *Principles of Philosophy* XXVIII.

<sup>63</sup> In the first place, it may create a paradox, in which a static point is sought in a purely temporal, hence ever-changing process. Kant's remark (CPR, A381) that "time has nothing abiding," is pertinent. To seek in temporally determined process for an absolutely unshakeable foundation would be an inquiry doomed from the start. Since there is something of such a search in modern social science, it has already failed.

<sup>64</sup> Arendt, *The Human Condition*, p. 105.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 296f, also *Between Past and Future*, p. 57.

<sup>66</sup> *Inter alia* Arendt, *Between Past and Future*, esp. pp. 58f, 102; also Helmer and Eddington, *Urbanman: The Psychology of Urban Survival*: NY (Macmillan), 1973, where social psychology reduces as citizen to a species of equipment.

<sup>67</sup> A good example will be found in Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

<sup>68</sup> Greer, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

<sup>69</sup> Not in the Whiteheadian sense, to be sure.

<sup>70</sup> Hempel, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

<sup>71</sup> This term is adopted by Piaget, *inter alia*, for precisely the reason suggested. However, other writers, e.g., von Wright, not only have no qualms about the term "teleology," but claim succession to the "Aristotelian" teleology for their doctrine. This seems justified, if Kant's discussion of teleological judgment is adapted to modern structuralism.

<sup>72</sup> I.e., what is done for the sake of progress may violate communal norms.

<sup>73</sup> Lord Acton, cited in Arendt, *Between Past and Future*, p. 96.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>75</sup> Victor Ferkiss, *Technological Man*: NY (NAL), 1969; p. 35f.

<sup>76</sup> Arendt, *The Human Condition*, p. 188 (note).

<sup>77</sup> Hannah Arendt, *On Violence*: NY (Harbrace), 1969; p. 19.

<sup>78</sup> Civil service unions, representing a quarter-million New York City employees, have discovered the truth of this; they use their influence, seemingly unjustified by their numbers. The sensitivity of their positions is only partial explanation for the degree to which they compel city hall.

<sup>79</sup> Arendt, *On Violence*, p. 28.

<sup>80</sup> See note 54 *supra*.

<sup>81</sup> Arendt, *Crises of the Republic*, p. 8.

<sup>82</sup> Arendt, *Between Past & Future*, p. 103.

<sup>83</sup> Josiah Royce, *The Problem of Christianity*: Chicago (U. Chicago), 1968; p. 111.

<sup>84</sup> Max Weber, *The City*: NY (Macmillan), 1958; p. 97.

<sup>85</sup> While it would be a mistake to maintain an original connection between these two different kinds of deliberative assemblies, it certainly seems that the formal awareness of the ancient model modified the tradition of the latter Germanic survival. There appears to be less evidence commonly available about possible cognate non-Western parallels.

<sup>86</sup> Arendt, *The Human Condition*, p. 81; Aristotle maintains that the form of the constitution determines the qualifications for the citizen (*Politics* 1278a1-40).

<sup>87</sup> Royce, *op. cit.*, p. 77f.

<sup>88</sup> There certainly is a reciprocity between the generation of restrictions on citizenship and the changing shape of the community defined by the restrictions . . .

<sup>89</sup> Morgenbesser, in Emmet & MacIntyre, *op. cit.*, p. 25; the fact that the weaker sort of propositions (from the perspective of analytic philosophers, anyway), is admitted as appropriate to the social sciences, is significant.

<sup>90</sup> Mircea Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane*: NY (Harbrace), 1959; p. 50 f.

<sup>91</sup> Arendt, *Crises of the Republic*, p. 17f.

<sup>92</sup> McNaughton, cited in Arendt, *Crises of the Republic*, p. 28.

<sup>93</sup> Grreer, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

<sup>94</sup> It also seems the recent shift toward greater interest in cities among social scientists has been prompted by the availability of grant money for such studies, not a serious recognition of the city *qua* hypotyposis of the human social domain. A casual remark by Professor Rayna Rapp of The New School suggests this fact, added to increasing circumscription of foreign fields of anthropological inquiry, has provoked the development of American urban anthropology.

<sup>95</sup> Arendt, *Between Past and Future*, p. 64.

<sup>96</sup> Royce, *op. cit.*, p. 82; Royce cites with approval the opinion of Wundt, whose inquiry into common consciousness and common will might be seen as important forerunners of modern structuralist thinking of various sorts.

<sup>97</sup> Inspired by numerous "minority opinion" political thinkers, e.g., Leo Strauss in Schmitt, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

<sup>98</sup> Arendt's location of the origin of the political "image" in the family (*The Human Condition*, p. 39f), suggests the relationship to other notions of social, political obligation similarly based in the family. Where Weber makes of this intermediate structure a hindrance to the formation of a homogeneous deliberative body, the traditional viewpoint of this as politically foundational makes it a necessary—at least, historically—mediation. Cf. *The Human Condition*, p. 23f and note, p. 23.

<sup>99</sup> Presumably, *parole*, not *langue*; it is common speech which is political.

<sup>100</sup> Arendt, *The Human Condition*, p. 19; cf. Kirk & Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers*: London (CUP) 1957 *et. seq.*; p. 213. #254.

<sup>101</sup> Eric Vögelin, *The New Science of Politics*: Chicago (U. Chicago), 1952; p. 27.

<sup>102</sup> Arendt, *The Human Condition*, p. 38f.

<sup>103</sup> C.S. Peirce, *Selected Writings*: New York (Dover), 1958; p. 83.

<sup>104</sup> Arendt, *Between Past and Future*, p. 222.

<sup>105</sup> This perception informs the work of Hannah Arendt and Ernst Vollrath (*Rekonstruktion der politischen Urteilskraft*, delivered in an early form at the New School Graduate Faculty). In accordance with the "political" reading of the 3rd Critique, it is appropriate that after a discussion of the judgmental faculty of taste, the judgmental faculty of purposiveness is addressed. A prudent choice is one that is tasteful; as tasteful, it embodies and expresses the standards operative in a given body-politic, and espoused by its members; as such, it comprehends the common purposiveness of that body-politic.

<sup>106</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*: New York (Hafner), 1951; p. 201.

<sup>107</sup> Josiah Royce, *The Problem of Christianity*: Chicago (U. Chicago), 1968; p. 236.

<sup>108</sup> Macdonald, *Against the American Grain*: New York (Random), 1962; p. 37. Also Cox, *The Secular City*: New York (Macmillan), 1966; p. 34.

<sup>109</sup> See Martin Heidegger, "The Age of the World View" in *The Question Concerning Technology*. . . : New York (HarRow), 1977.

<sup>110</sup> Arendt, *Between Past and Future*, p. 62.

<sup>111</sup> This point has been made often and persuasively by Vollrath, both in the work cited above and in other occasional papers.

<sup>112</sup> ME "D," 1013a24-34, 1013b4f.

<sup>113</sup> However simple it may seem—and it is, after all, part of the intellectual set of most Western educated people since first set out in classical antiquity—the doctrine of causes is subject to a need for careful consideration. One can lose sight of the originary meaning of cause, as has been shown by Heidegger (among others) in the title essay of *The Question Concerning Technology*. . . (*supra*).

<sup>114</sup> Compare this with the Aristotelian doctrine, in which form, embracing the totality, tends toward preeminence: 1013b22, 1017b21-26. While there is a species of teleology in Descartes' doctrine—a limited sort, by analogy, in which parts exist for the end of the whole—the necessity of this teleology seems rather less emphatic than Aristotle's "that-for-the-sake-of-which" (*to hou heneka*). In the final analysis, it is quite possible to find a machine whose whole action is unaffected appreciably by the normal wear which alters its parts.

<sup>115</sup> Mumford's *The City in History* is an example of the former; Arango's *Urbanization of the Earth* exemplifies the latter.

<sup>116</sup> Dahl's *Who Governs?* exemplifies the former, and Sennett's various tomes often show the latter character.

## Notes on Contributors

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